Values, Priorities and the Dual Allegiance of Public University Trustees

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Abstract

Governing boards of colleges, universities, and systems in the United States have a unique

relationship with the institutions they govern. Trustees, largely lacking experience in academia

or academic affairs, must strike a balance between advocating for the desires of their institutions

and those of state leaders, which are not always in agreement. This often results in conflicts with

the persons responsible for advancing and distributing knowledge- the faculty. In this paper, I

trace the evolution of the lay board of public universities in America and compile conceptual and

empirical literature on conflicts between faculty and trustees.

Values, priorities and the dual allegiance of public university trustees

Public university trustees, among their many responsibilities, serve as the middle men between the state and the higher education institutions they govern. They serve both as representatives of and authorities over their colleges and universities. Their allegiance is to their institutions or systems, but also to state leaders who are responsible for their appointment. Trustees are thus in a unique position- perceived as both friend and foe to higher education institutions. The largely non-academic background of most trustees, their dual allegiance, and their limited interaction with members of the higher education community are factors that contribute to differences in values and priorities between public university trustees and members within the higher education community, especially faculty.

Previous studies have assessed conflict that exists within higher education institutions between administration and the faculty (Gmelch & Carroll, 1991; Holton, 1995; Rawls, 1998). There are fewer studies that consider the conflicts that exist between the governing board members and the institutions they represent. Many of these are conceptual rather than empirical, and prescriptive rather than descriptive. However, despite the deficiency in exploration of relationships between faculty and trustees, there is much to be gained from understanding why the differences emerge and how they are manifested. This insight is crucial for improving, where necessary, the relationships between the persons responsible for the advancement and distribution of knowledge and those that have ultimate authority over the higher education institutions they govern.

The scope of this paper is not to depict a distinct relationship in which one group is victimized while the other is vilified. Though I allude to some episodic examples to illustrate

areas of conflict, the use of cases is not intended to suggest that they can or should be generalized. Instead, in this paper I compile previous literature that suggests potential conflicts that may exist between faculty and trustees due to three primary causes: the distinct largely non-academic backgrounds of trustees, the politics that result in a dual allegiance to institutions and states (or state leaders), and trustees' limited interaction with members of the higher education community. I conclude with recommendations found in the literature for avoiding conflict and moving forward in the best interest of higher education.

Faculty and Boards: Backgrounds and Values

Though there are numerous differences between faculty and trustees, they have two important things in common: they are all in positions of public trust and, for the most part, aim to act in the best interest of the higher education institutions they represent. Faculty members are trusted by the public to act in the best interest of society, especially in their teaching and research activities. They are expected to prioritize the public good over self- interests, and in return are governed differently and given much more autonomy than employees in other organizations. This is manifested in the large decentralization that is characteristic of higher education institutions, in which faculty are more often reviewed by peers than administrators. Trustees are also in positions of public trust. They are selected, either by appointment or general election, to serve the public interest. This role is inherent in their nature: they exist to link higher education institutions to the respective states in which they are housed and ensure that they are acting in the best interest of society. Few, if any, trustees or faculty members would question the need to maintain high- quality higher education institutions. The differences, however, emerge over questions on how to accomplish this.

Board Composition

Historically, trustees have predominantly come from non-academic backgrounds. What's more, the majority of trustees come from business backgrounds, an occupation associated with principles and values that are sometimes at odds with what is valued within the Academy. These differences sometimes result in struggles such as prioritization of quality over efficiency and best ways to measure outcomes and productivity.

From the birth of colleges in America to the mid- 19th century, members of governing boards were largely clergymen and governmental officials. If a lay board is defined as a governing board that is comprised by non-faculty, then American colleges and universities have always had predominantly lay boards. However, boards did evolve to include persons who were neither governmental officials nor clergymen. In 1636, the first board of trustees in the United States, which was formed to govern Harvard University, was composed of non-academics. The cause for the lay nature of these boards is contested. While some argue that the original intent of founders was to emulate the English system of resident- faculty control, but there was not a body of scholars in the early colonies to teach and govern themselves (Trow, 1990), others suggest that the lay board was intentionally chosen to avoid an ineffective model that provided excessive autonomy (Thelin, 2004).

Whatever the reason for having a board that was comprised primarily of non- faculty members, this is an important characteristic of governing boards in America. Other colonial colleges followed Harvard's lay model of governance, which only included clergymen and governmental officials until 1850 when board membership was opened to non- clergymen and non- governmental officials in Michigan. This opportunity was provided following a

constitutional convention in the state where it was determined that a representative from each judicial district was to be elected. 14 years later, Nevada followed with an elected board of regents for the state university (Areen, 2010).

Despite the evolution of governing boards to include non-clergymen and non-governmental officials, persons of academic backgrounds have remained largely underrepresented on boards. Furthermore, the majority of trustees of public universities today come from business backgrounds, an occupation that is characterized by certain principles and values that are not always in accordance with those of higher education institutions, due to their distinct nature.

The Higher Education Corporation

Speculations as to the adequacy of having businessmen as leaders of higher education institutions are not new. The title of Thorstein Veblen's (1918) book, *Higher Learning in America: A memorandum on the conduct of universities by business men,* illustrates this. In the book, Veblen was specifically criticizing the composition of governing boards of higher education institutions and the prevalence of men with business backgrounds.

Unlike Veblen's suggested characterization of board members, not all trustees today are businessmen. However, the large majority have a non-academic background. According to the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities (AGB), the professional background of half of public college and university trustees and over half of private college and university trustees is business (2010). What's more, in both private and public institutions, trustees with educational backgrounds (primary, secondary, or postsecondary) comprise less than 16 percent of board members.

Business values do not always align with what is valued in the higher education community. There are numerous, significant differences between organizations such as corporations and higher education institutions. Most notable of these are Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972) characteristics that comprise what they term "organized anarchies", which refer to higher education institutions. Among these were the ambiguous goals, unclear technologies, and fluid participation that characterized higher education institutions and made them distinct from traditional organizations.

Unlike business organizations, in which profit is clearly identified as the primary goal, colleges and universities do not possess such clear goals or missions, either as a sector or individually. What's more, there are often conflicting views within these organizations as to what the goals of the organization are. This reality makes it difficult to assess outcomes- there is no equivalent to "profit" in the academic world. Whereas some, particularly proponents of the completion agenda, would point to graduation rates to measure performance, other indicators are used by stakeholders inside and outside the academy. Similarly, methods of producing (whatever the product is) are unclear, partly because the product is undefined. Processes change- what works for a particular institution at one point may not work at another time- and are sometimes adopted or abandoned based on prior results. In the production of knowledge and of graduates, there is no comparable process to that involved in the production of iPads. Finally, fluid participation is a general property that distinguishes higher education institutions from traditional organizations. Not everyone has to participate in any given decision and not everyone is allowed to participate in all decisions. Therefore, the bureaucratic governance that is characteristic of business organizations is not always compatible with the higher education

community, which is comprised of professionals and is partly characterized by collegiality (Baldridge et al., 1977).

Tierney (2005) also notes that boards bring language and attitudes from business to their notion of an effective campus that often deviate from the attitudes of faculty, particularly over what constitutes effectiveness and quality. For trustees, particularly those with business backgrounds, students are equated to consumers and customers. While faculty would agree with the notion that students must be served in the best way possible, may contend that this consumer-based approach to institutional effectiveness is too simplistic and ignores other important goals for higher education, especially the advancement of knowledge. Oftentimes, conflicts arise not over the question of the importance of serving students, but rather over the best way to prioritize the three primary goals of universities: service, teaching and research (Boyer, 1990; Fairweather, 2002).

Whereas to trustees the organization is a business, few faculty members enter academe with the assumption that students are customers. The product of higher education is much more complex than merely fully- paid graduates. Rather, faculty members give much more importance to the production of knowledge in and outside the classroom as well as the distribution of this knowledge.

Politics and the Dual Allegiance

In addition to disagreements over values and priorities in higher education institutions resulting from differences between the socialization of academics and those that do not have a background in academia or academic affairs, conflicts between faculty and trustees may emerge from the unique position that governing boards hold. Governing boards can be viewed as a

buffer between higher education institutions and the state. They represent their respective

institutions and serve to advocate in their favor when necessary, but they must also carry out

their duties of advocating for the public good and ensuring that the missions of the institutions

they govern are carried out. At times, these roles can be in conflict, and the attitudes that

institutional leaders have towards their boards can fluctuate. What's more, because persons

within the academy have virtually no say in the selection of the individuals that will hold

ultimate authority over decisions regarding institutions, the individuals selected have stronger

ties to the individuals responsible for their appointment, usually the governor. The power and

political relations at play in the appointment of board members and their implications on the

governance of higher education institutions has not been largely explored, but an examination of

the existing literature is worth pursuing to understand the relationships between trustees and

higher education institutions, particularly faculty.

The politics that stem from the selection of governing board members may contribute to

differences in values and priorities and to the allegiance that trustees feel to the institutions they

govern and represent. Most trustees are appointed by the governor, and in many cases the state

legislature must confirm the governor's choices. As of 2000, governors appointed all or a

portion of public college and university trustees in all states except for Minnesota, Nevada, and

South Carolina (Dika & Janosik, 2002). Seventy- seven percent of all board members in 2010

were appointed by the governor, 60 percent with confirmation by the state legislature (Ogle,

Toutsi & Novak, 2008).

Some state codes dictate criteria that must be used in the selection of trustees. The

majority of these criteria address demographic qualifications such as place of residence, voter

eligibility, or a balance of political party affiliation (Dika & Janosik, 2002). Most of the literature

on the criteria relating to personal attributes and characteristics that is used in the selection of governing board members is limited to the opinions of trustees and institutional representatives (AGB, 1981; Rose, 1993), but opinions of governors and executive staff, who are primarily responsible for appointments, have also been assessed (Dika & Janosik, 2002).

Rose's (1993) study found differences in the characteristics of trustees that members of the higher education community thought should be prioritized and those they felt were actually given more importance in the selection process. Rose found that interviewees felt that the criteria for selection of trustees that was actually considered included, in order of priority, political relationship with state officials, demonstrated leadership skills, personal integrity, minority status of individuals, and alumni status. More importantly, these descriptive criteria differed significantly from what interviewees believed *should* be prioritized in the selection of a trustee. These criteria included, in order of priority, demonstrated leadership skills, ability to contribute to and support the mission, direction and needs of the institution, commitment to the institution, personal integrity, and knowledge of higher education/familiarity with problems of higher education. Only two of the descriptive and prescriptive criteria overlapped (personal integrity and demonstrated leadership skills), and these were given different weights of importance. This study illustrates how the selected trustees may be distinct from what the higher education community would prefer. These characteristics may contribute to some of the disagreements in values and priorities that exist between selected trustees and faculty members.

Similarly, Dika and Janosik (2002) investigated what governors themselves reported as important criteria for the selection of trustees. The authors found that personal leadership qualities, educational background, and demonstrated success in the business world were reported as the most highly valued personal attributes of those listed. Success in the business world is not

a value or priority considered by higher education representatives in the selection of a trustee, as illustrated by Rose's study. The priority given to this consideration by governors, who have the highest power in the selection of trustees, is at odds with priorities regarding the selection of trustees that exist within the higher education community.

It is difficult to fully account for the politics involved in the selection of trustees, since all studies that have attempted to do it rely on self- reports, which may be politicized and not accurate or complete representations of the values considered and the process. Political pressures at play in the appointment of trustees are difficult to capture in empirical studies. Evidence of politics at play is anecdotal at best, but has been alluded to in the literature. Moos and Rourke (1959), for instance, noted that sometimes, the power to appoint is abused by governors who choose to play politics and "pack" the board to undercut institutional autonomy. Similarly, Kohn and Mortimer (1983) claim that the appointment of trustees in public institutions has been described as a fight over the 'three p's': prestige, politics, and power, since appointment to the university board carries much prestige and is used by some governors to repay political supporters. The media has also attempted to illustrate the politics behind trustee appointment. An article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, for instance, reported that Texas Governor Rick Perry received a total of $6.1 million in donations from Texas public university regents which he had appointed, 63 percent of which had given financial contributions to the governor during his ten years in office (Fain, 2010).

There are some efforts in place to buffer the effects of politics in the appointment of regents. One way in which this is manifested is through the length of terms. In an attempt to avoid strong political ties between governors and trustees and conflicts in allegiance, board members usually serve longer terms than those of the governors that appoint them. This practice

is largely in place to keep trustees insulated from overt control of a particular administration. In addition, AGB urges trustees to avoid pressures from public officials, particularly those responsible for their appointment that may compromise the autonomy of the institutions they represent. The mere existence of these efforts points to the perceived need to address potential conflicts that arise from the politics involved in the appointment of trustees.

Interactions and Attitudes

Tierney (2005) suggests that faculty members are not intimately involved in most issues involving the governance of their institutions. In addition, trustees are seldom involved in the day- to- day workings of higher education institutions. Their primary responsibilities, which are fiduciary, do not usually involve much interaction or "meddling" on campuses. In this sense, faculty and board members, for the most part, understand their own roles and do not become intimately involved in issues over which they do not have responsibilities. However, despite a relatively clear understanding of their own roles, each group frequently misunderstands what the other does. This deficiency may be due to limited interaction between faculty members and trustees. Previous research has demonstrated that communication between trustees and faculty members, two of the three groups involved in the shared governance of colleges and universities, is infrequent and often insignificant. This limited interaction translates to misunderstandings and poor knowledge of each others' roles, which could contribute to weak relationships between these two parties.

According to an AGB report, the primary way in which trustees and faculty interact is in social events, including academic ceremonies and athletic contests (Schwartz, Skinner & Bowen, 2009). The second most cited method of interaction between trustees and faculty is through presidential search committees. In both of these scenarios, the amount and proportion of faculty

members present are miniscule and the extent of the interactions is not of much significance. Other more significant interactions, in terms of content and relation to academics, include faculty presentations to the board and trustee classroom, laboratory or studio visitation, the latter of which was mentioned by half of interviewees.

Due to these limited interactions between faculty and trustees, both in quantity and quality, there is often inadequate understanding of each others' roles. According to the same AGB report on faculty and governing boards, only about 30 percent of faculty orientations incorporate some instruction about the roles and responsibilities of the governing board. What's more, less than one quarter of presidents interviewed believed that the faculty members at their institutions understand the role of the board "well" and only three percent claimed that they understood it "very well". On the other hand, orientations for board members were more likely to include instruction on the roles and responsibilities of faculty in institutional governance (56 percent) and the culture of decision-making (60 percent). What's more, more than one third of orientations cover promotion and tenure and academic freedom, though boards of public institutions are less likely to cover this than boards of private institutions. However, when asked about the perceived extent of trustees' understanding of faculty roles and responsibilities, presidents responded similarly to the aforementioned perceptions of faculty members' understanding of trustee roles and responsibilities. Twenty percent of presidents felt that trustees understood faculty members' roles "well" and three percent responded "very well" (Schwartz, Skinner & Bowen, 2009).

The report documents perceptions of negative interactions between faculty members and trustees in addition to limited interactions. Some common themes found in the interviews included that interaction between faculty and trustees is infrequent and contentious when issues

arise and that trustees are viewed by faculty through an adversarial labor vs. management lens.

On the other hand, interviewees noted, faculty are viewed by trustees as privileged, too powerful,

and overpaid and the credibility is lost due to the fact that the contact faculty do have with

trustees is used to lobby for personal interests or to complain, which turns trustees off.

A couple of quotes captured in the report best illustrate some negative perceptions of the

interactions that exist between faculty and trustees. One interviewed president described the

relationship between the two groups as "strained—new governing board members believe

faculty have too much power, too many rights and are overpaid," while another noted that

"faculty wish to complain instead of bringing ideas to solve problems" (Schwarz, Skinner &

Bowen, 2009, p. 11).

Despite the meager interaction between trustees and faculty members today, Tierney

(2005) noted that trustee and faculty members' are becoming increasingly aware of each others'

place in the governance of higher education. This increased awareness, he thought, was largely

the result of conflict and disagreements as to values and priorities in higher education and did not

necessarily reflect a positive relationship between the two parties.

Manifestation of Conflict

The aforementioned characterizations of governing board members as primarily having

non-academic and business- influenced backgrounds, their dual allegiance due to appointment

methods, and the limited interaction that takes place with faculty members are factors that

contribute to the conflict that manifests between faculty members and trustees. As is evident by

the previous section on limited interaction and communication between faculty and governing

boards, conflict occurs more episodically rather than routinely. However, the underlying

differences in values and priorities that exist between these two actors in the shared governance of higher education institutions do result in conflicts over decisions. What's more, the current trends toward marketization and corporatization of higher education may exacerbate these situations. At a time in which institutions are being asked to do more with less (Kane, Orszag & Gunter, 2003), different forms of accountability and increased scrutiny on institutional behavior give rise to tensions not only between higher education institutions and the states that demand accountability, but also governing boards that serve as the middle men.

Historical Roots

The history of higher education in the United States provides insight into conflicts in the governance of colleges and universities. At first, universities served simple purposes: to train men to be clergy or engage in public service. This mission, which was directly influenced by the English higher education model, did not result in much conflict with governance. However, following the Civil War, universities in the United States began to feel the influence of German universities that had different priorities than those of traditional higher education institutions in the United States (Areen, 2010). Of particular interest to American institutions was the focus on research that was prevalent in German universities. This additional interest in higher education organizations was accompanied by a shift in the work of academics from non-professional to professional, manifested in the increased specialization of faculty (Clark, 1963). This phenomenon, coupled with the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862 that meaningfully improved access to higher education and highlighted the role of the university in promoting the public good, significantly changed the vision for higher education in America (Kerr, 1963).

The clashes between trustees and faculty that gave rise to shared governance in American universities can be traced back to the late 19th century when faculty members conducted more original research and developed expertise in a variety of disciplines (Areen, 2010). Possibly the best episodic illustration of the first conflicts between faculty and trustees is the clash that resulted in the formation of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The conflict was between Edward Ross, a professor at Stanford University, and Ms. Jane Lathrop Stanford, the sole trustee of the university. Ms. Stanford, who was offended by Dr. Ross's criticisms of the exploitation of foreign labor, requested that he be fired. The then president of Stanford, David Starr Jordan, proceeded to honor Ms. Stanford's request (Elliott, 1975).

Shared Governance

With its inception, the AAUP issued a widely known statement on academic freedom, a concept borrowed from German universities ("Declaration of principles on academic freedom and academic tenure," 1915). In addition to academic freedom, the statement introduced a new concept that addressed the lay nature of university trustees in America and was intended to ameliorate or avoid future conflict in the governance of higher education institutions between faculty and governing boards. This concept, which applies only to academic matters, has come to be known as shared governance and consists of distinct responsibilities for trustees, faculty and administrations. The statement that introduced the concept of shared governance also advocated joint efforts in framing and executing long-range plans, decisions regarding existing or prospective physical resources, budgeting, and collaboration in the selection of a new president. 50 years later, a statement by the AAUP and the American Council for Education (ACE), echoed the previously attributed practical importance of shared governance in their joint statement ("Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities", 1966).

The statements made by these national organizations also illustrate conflict between these groups, though in a more subtle way than the case study involving Dr. Ross illustrated above. In 1968, the AAUP released a statement that claimed that the faculty voice should be authoritative across the entire range of university decision making because of the centrality of teaching and research in higher education. The authors of the statement claimed that university and corporate governance must be differentiated for legal, education and social reasons. The Association of Governing Boards released its own statement in 1998. In this statement AGB stated that the "ultimate responsibility for the institution rests in its governing board". They claimed that fiduciary responsibility drives ultimate decision-making. The American Association of University Professors perceived this statement as an erosion of faculty influence in decision-making, which resulted in conflict between faculty and governing boards regarding decision-making power. Since then, the conflict has been abated by subsequent statements that promote more cooperation and less competition, such as AGB's incorporation of a clause stating that trustees should be able to articulate the value of academic freedom and defend it on behalf of institutions and professors.

Few studies have assessed conflict between boards and faculty, and evidence of their existence is primarily non-academic, with the media socializing conflict. There are few examples of empirically documented cases of this conflict. What's more these reports, either by the media or resulting from research studies, are evidence of episodic manifestations of conflict between faculty and boards and don't reflect the norm. However, one of the ways in which conflict between faculty and trustees emerges is over issues of accountability, particularly learning outcomes and measures of productivity.

Present- Day Conflict

accountability.

One of the primary ways in which tensions between faculty and trustees over the governance of academic affairs is manifested is through accountability. Trustees have the challenging task of promoting academic quality without undermining faculty members' responsibilities for academic matters under the shared governance model. Disrespecting the role of the faculty in academic matters can often result in conflict, which is why it is also important that faculty members understand that trustees also have a role to play in ensuring that quality is preserved in instruction and other academic matters. As I alluded to earlier, several factors, including decreased funding for higher education coupled with trends toward privatization, corporatization and marketization of higher education contribute to increased scrutiny of colleges and universities. This increased scrutiny is accompanied by louder calls for accountability of higher education institutions, and the faculty are not exempt from these requests.

As noted previously, most trustees have business backgrounds, which are associated with certain values and principles related to accountability. Tener (1999) notes that the faculty mindset has an inherent aversion to outcomes assessment. He attributes this to certain properties he believes are characteristic of faculty members, including resistance to change, academic skepticism to outside opinions, difficulty with the notion of customers and customer satisfaction, and resistance to certain businesslike language. Although these are broad generalizations that, if applied, result in impractical pessimism as to the successful application of outcomes and performance assessment, it illustrates perceptions of faculty that result in conflict when it comes to accountability in higher education. A more nuanced account of the conflicting views on

accountability held by trustees and faculty members would allude to the lack of a definition and agreement as to the prioritization of "quality", "learning outcomes" and "productivity".

Trustees generally are perceived by members of the higher education community as over-emphasizing efficiency over quality, particularly when the former refers to increased production in light of decreased resources. This is consistent with the aforementioned discussion on the values that are associated with the business community but are not equally applicable to higher education institutions, which differ significantly from traditional organizations. Faculty, on the other hand, tend to argue in favor of quality, which is difficult to measure with existing indicators, such as graduation rates and performance on standardized exams. Similarly, faculty members are not typically receptive to current measures of productivity, which usually stress hours teaching and often undervalue research.

An example of this tension is evident in Texas, which is currently dealing with conflict between faculty and the governing boards, particularly of the state's two flagship institutions (Texas A&M and The University of Texas at Austin). The tensions stem from regent activity that is perceived as not protecting the image of the institution they represent, but rather attacking faculty in terms of productivity and placing increased pressures to improve cost-effectiveness, considering governor-backed proposals to divide teaching and research budgets and evaluate faculty based on student evaluations and/or cost-benefit analysis (revenue generated via tuition compared to faculty salaries). At A&M, there was a "bottom line" system implemented, which received much criticism and was criticized by the AAUP as an oversimplification of faculty work. This ongoing debate, which has resulted in the formation of a Joint Oversight Committee in the state legislature to address issues of governance in higher education, is an illustration of

incongruities over ways to measure productivity between trustees and individuals within the higher education community.

academic freedom.

In addition to accountability, conflict between trustees and faculty members emerges over issues in academic freedom. In addition to the dismissal of Dr. Ross in Stanford, scholars have identified other manifestations of conflict over academic freedom between trustees and faculty. Concerns over political correctness are often at the center of these conflicts. For instance, Tierney (2005) notes that board members have been known to limit faculty's ability to invite certain individuals to speak on campus. This was a common case following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, when the issue of terrorism was a sensitive topic. An association composed of trustees and alumni, even, have accused professors of being insufficiently patriotic in their reaction to the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, Tierney suggests that in controversial areas such as affirmative action and multiculturalism, boards have become more involved recently, sometimes resulting in censure and perceived violations of academic freedom.

teaching v. research.

Another important area in which tensions between faculty and trustees emerge is in questions over the value of research, particularly as compared to teaching. Research did not become an important function of higher education institutions in the United States until the influences of German universities were felt. The roles of higher education institutions have changed significantly since then (Boyer, 1990). Today, the majority of faculty at universities, primarily doctoral- granting universities, prioritize research. This is due to the socialization of academics today and the prestige, power and reward structure that is in place. Few professors at doctoral- granting institutions are rewarded for their excellence in teaching, especially compared

to the prestige and both tangible and intangible compensation that accompanies excellence in research. Partly for these reasons, but also because of personal preferences for conducting research, faculty at doctoral- granting institutions, and increasingly in other types of institutions, are engaging in large amount of research.

In response, critics have begun to speculate about the adequacy of the emphasis (or lack thereof) on teaching at higher education institutions. Tierney (2005) notes that, until recently, few people questioned the role of research in higher education institutions. However, recent attention drawn to the fact that faculty, especially tenure and tenure- track faculty do not teach many classes (if at all), has contributed to criticism of the faculty workload, in terms of quantity and quality. This is especially true at public institutions where value of the public investment is increasingly under scrutiny, especially at times in which states are seeing strained budgets as we are today. Critics sometimes do not see the connection between research and the public good and simply view it as a private good for professors and a means of advancing in their professions. As a result, there are calls for increased teaching loads.

other conflicts.

In addition to issues over learning outcomes, faculty productivity, and debates over the prioritization of teaching and research, there is evidence of conflict between trustees and faculty over collective bargaining issues and the ability of faculty to consult or engage in other external- revenue- generating activities. A related issue pertains to intellectual property rights with faculty and trustees having contentious conversations over the ownership of such property. Finally, decisions regarding the curriculum also lead to some conflict between faculty members and trustees.

Recommendations

Many recommendations for effective governing board performance have been cited in the literature on governing boards, which, as previously mentioned, is largely prescriptive rather than descriptive. Chait et al. (1996), for instance, identified six distinct properties that are characteristic of effective boards of trustees. Among these were the abilities to take culture and norms of the institution into account; possess adequate knowledge about the institution; work as a group; recognize complexities and subtleties of issues; accept the primary responsibility to develop and maintain healthy relationships among major constituents; and envision a direction.

To address potential causes of tension between faculty and trustees, such as inherent differences in backgrounds, values and priorities; barriers to successful board-faculty interaction; insufficient and inadequate interaction and communication; and lack of mutual understanding and respect, AGB proposes a list of recommendations. Among these recommendations are improved instruction to incoming board members and incoming faculty members regarding not only their own roles and responsibilities, but also those of the other group. This can be achieved most practically and efficiently during orientation programs. In addition, AGB suggests continuing education for trustees regarding the faculty profession and academic culture. In addition, to encourage the involvement of faculty in governance decisions, AGB recommends that faculty be recognized for their service on governance bodies. This recognition is best manifested through promotion and tenure, which is of utmost significance in the career of an academic. Among other suggestions, AGB includes increased opportunities for interactions between the two groups and the selection of experienced educators to serve on boards.

Conclusion

Faculty members and trustees comprise two of the three groups charged with shared governance of higher education institutions. Trustees of public universities in the United States are distinct in that they are largely from non- academic background.   At times, their business-like influences, coupled with other divergences from norms within the academic community, contribute to conflict, particularly over issues regarding accountability, efficiency and productivity. Governing boards are invested with the ultimate authority to make key decisions for America's colleges and universities. Faculty, on the other hand, are tasked with carrying out the core missions of higher education, particularly the advancement and dissemination of knowledge. Despite their differences, both groups are here to stay, and, in Tierney's (2005) words, "divorce is not possible". Therefore, through better understanding of each others' roles and the abandonment of stereotypes that can hinder cooperation, trustees will be able to continue to serve in the best interest of higher education.

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